

Political History Collection
Interview H.0001.12 : Tape 12

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Interviewed by: Paljor Tsarong
Name: Drakten [Tib. grags bstan]
Gender: Male
Age: 58
Date of Birth: 1935

Abstract

Drakten [Tib. grags bstan] was a monk official in the traditional Tibetan government who discusses in detail the political events that occurred in Lhasa in the 1950s. In this interview, he discusses the arrival of the Chinese at Drowaganag and the peace talks he heard of in Lhasa. He then mentions the lack of support from the U.S., India and from England, concerning the sending of arms. Additionally, he discusses the planning and negotiations of the 17-Point Agreement, and its effect on the Dalai Lama.

Tape 12

Q: In 1949 and in 1950, in 1949 the Chinese were saying that they were going to liberate Tibet. Were they saying the same in '48? And around 1949-50 where were you staying?

A: I think that was only in 1949. In 1949-50 I was in Kham in Sangnga Chödzhong [Tib. gsang sgnags chos rdzong]. Kungö Shatsela was the dzongpön, so I went to serve Kungö. Sangnga Chödzhong is in the most south eastern part of Tibet. The eastern part borders with China and Sangnga Chödzhong is Tsawarongpa. And then it touches Kongtserawa [Tib. kong rtse ra ba], the place where the round tea bricks are produced. Once that area is traversed, then one gets to Jün [Tib. 'jun]. Then pasT that, I think it goes to Chengdu, but I don't know. Jün itself is Chinese territory. It is Chinese territory [Tib. rgya sde] but the people are Tibetans. Towards the south, one reaches Doragang [Tib. ?] in Assam. Some of the area also touches Burma. If you go to Dzayul [Tib. rdza yul] you can go to Burma as well as India. So this is where Sangnga Chödzhong [is].

Q: While you were there, what do you hear politically?

A: During that time, the Chinese Communists had just won, and since it was a victorious time, we were not the only ones, but all nearby and weaker areas, they stretched their hands and their feet. Anyway, to Tibet they sent some long letters. On one side was Chinese, and on the other, Tibetan printing script [Tib. dbu chen]. The letter stated, "Zhongyang is coming to Tibet to expel the foreign imperialist's force and to help Tibetans to develop. There is nothing for you all to fear, so let us borrow your roads. And from Tibet we are going for the long march [Tib. rgyang skyod] into Asia." This is what was said in the letters. Then they sent other letters saying that they were going to come on this date and that date. Every time we got such a letter, we immediately sealed them and sent an adrung messenger to Chamdo, and said that such letters were arriving and [asking them] what we should do about protecting the areas. At Sangnga Chödzhong there were two main routes, so we said that there were such routes and [asked] what should be done about guarding them. We did not send any letters to the Chinese but only noted that such letters arrived. It seems that the various dzongpön could not write. We sent the adrung and it was the time during Lhalu. The reply that we got said that it was good that we received these reports from the various areas, and so whatever news arrived, continue to send it. It also stated, to the various areas, "You have to send separate orders. So Dzogang [Tib. mdzo sgang] Dzongpön, Tog Magpön [Tib. tog dmag dpon] and Sangnga Chödzhong, the three regions must protect whatever route passes in your area. Each one is responsible for one's own area and you cannot allow anyone to enter or run away. You must call up the militia and whatever arms you have, you should gather them. Regarding arms and reinforcements, it is presently under consideration." During Lhalu's time we received such orders. Sangnga Chödzhong was very large and there were numerous regions [Tib. sde shog kha]. So all the various areas under a dingpön, that is under a dingkhag [Tib. lding khag]. There is an area under each shengo, like Dzayul Shengo, Tsamingong [Tib. tsha ba smin gong] Shengo, Lingkar [Tib. gling dkar] Shengo, Rogpatsang, Ngumey where the chief was nicknamed, Head Fire [Tib. mgo la me 'bar]. So the areas were numerous and the larger areas were under one dingpön. The dzongpön sent them orders saying, "We have received such orders from Chamdo and the Chinese were sending such letters, and when we informed Chamdo, they sent us such and such orders and so therefore, if the Chinese come up, then each area must

defend their respected territories. This is the order from Chamdo. So basically, Dzogang Dzongpön, Tog Magpön, the three of us were in communication. However, from our areas, each dingkhag in accordance with its size—the dzong had a taxation book [Tib. 'bab deb] which showed the population and the amount of land and according to that, it was like a tax in which we said, 'You have such amount of land and accordingly you will send so much soldiers.' Please send the list (or people). The dzongpön needs the list and the day you are ordered to come you must be ready to leave." So the dzongpön sent orders to the various dingkhag. Then we got the soldier's list or magshung [Tib. dmag gzhung]. According to the orders from Chamdo, the three dzongpön discussed and the first area from which the Chinese could come [from] was Shugola [Tib. shog bu la] Pass which was under Dzogang Dzong. When spies were sent, they said that it was a vulnerable area. On top of Shugola, at the Tog Magpön, was Porongka Chandzöla, who was the one who died later in Kalimpong. The tsidrun who was the Dzogang Dzongpön and Sangnga Chödzung, was Kungö Shatsela. Each of them took some selected soldiers along with able bodied servants, and the three stayed on top of Shugola Pass guarding the place for a while. So all of the three kungö were there. The Chinese said that they were coming, but then they did not come. But the letters kept on coming. Then they said that the Chinese were not coming, and so maybe [it would be] better if one of them stayed since each one had responsibilities in one's own area. Shugola was the main route, however there were ways to come from Tog Magpön as well as Sangnga Chödzung. So since Shugola was under Dzogang Dzongpön, he stayed and the other two returned to their own area. Then at Sangnga Chödzung, they said that the Chinese were coming via Tsawarongpa. Messengers were coming from Tsawarongpa who said that they had arrived and that they said that they were coming up, and that they could not do anything so they [should] please do what they could to stop them. They also received word on the number of Chinese. Once again, we sent the information to Chamdo. Anyway, we did have soldiers (militia) ready, but if it did come to war, then we expected the real soldiers of the government to fight and the militia to support them. That was the expectation. There was no way that the militia, who had one or two guns, could actually manage to attack their military camp. The other side was a military camp with well armed professional soldiers and we were just militia, some of whom did not know how to fire a gun. We got the soldiers ready and were waiting for the arms. Our adrun messenger went to Chamdo but did not return. He was our servant, Phurbu Tsewang [Tib. phur bu tshe dbang]. He gave the message that the Chinese had arrived in Tsawarongpa. According to the custom, during an emergency, the adrun's sash is sealed and he is not permitted to take off his sash. He has to travel day and night and is not permitted to sleep. Before he returned, the Chinese who came via Tsawarongpa had come to Drowagang [Tib. 'gro ba sgang], which is just near Sangnga Chödzung. This area of Drowagang is arrived at from Tsawarongpa and there is also the road to Dzayul. The numbers that came via the upper part, Tö, come to Drowagang and then to Sangnga Chödzung. Then Tsawarongpa up that side and Dzayul down this way. At Drowagang there is a small monastery. Just before sunset a messenger came saying that the Chinese had arrived at Drowagang. He said that about 11-12 Chinese came and they were saying that they were going to Dzayul and also Sangnga Chödzung. They were asking about all the roads and looking at maps. There was no one who knew the language. So the message came saying they had arrived there just now. Since they had already arrived, so far there was just one of two officials here. In order to fight, the militia were also not close by and the messenger had not arrived from Chamdo. There were also no arms. There wasn't anything that could be done about it. So immediately we saddled [the horses], hoping to get to Chamdo, and left. As we travelled for a while, we heard that they had already come to Chamdo. That's what we heard. As we came up, they had already come to Lhodzung. At that time they had Khyungpo Tengchen, the Chinese soldiers had encircled us. So when we went up to Lhodzung, the upper areas were full of Chinese. So we travelled via the south along the mountains, where there was no road at all, hiding among the forests, and that's how we came up.

Q: While Lhalu was there, Ngabö had come, right? After he came, did he send any orders regarding meetings, or were there any changes in the opinion of the people regarding whether they should fight or not?

A: We received a reply from Lhalu, but though Ngabö had arrived at Chamdo, we did not receive any orders from him. The messenger went up and never returned, right? The Chinese had arrived just about the time when the Ngabö did. Ngabö thought, "We cannot manage them by firing on them. There is no way we can return fire because in the earlier periods when the Chinese came, they were just one provincial army of Xining Tögya, Upper Chinese [Tib. stod rgya]. At that time, the whole of China was not involved. Even when the Xining Tögya came they gave us such a hard time. This time it is the army of the whole region of China. They have already ordered Western area command to move to Chengdu and into Tibet. We cannot manage this force with our guns and handguns, and it would only be a waste of life. However, we will have occasions for discussion and this time it's best that we discuss. If we could manage them, then, yes, we can fight. But if we cannot, then it's the same as jumping into the fire. No matter how many jump, you are going to get burned." So Ngabö did not at all have any thoughts about fighting. Lhalu wanted . At Chamdo Monastery there was Geshe Sherabla [Tib. shes rab lags], a very educated man who had come from [Sera] Tratsang Jey [in Lhasa]. Lhalu used to receive teachings of the Lam rabs [chemmo], from him, and had a great faith in him. At that time, this Geshe had passed away. His remains were kept in a tomb [Tib. dmar gdung]. Lhalu said that he did a senriy divination in front of Geshe Rimpoche's tomb on whether the enemy should be challenged or not. The answer was that he should challenge them. On requesting whether he should go on the offensive or fire when fired upon, the answer was that he should take the fight to them. That there was no hesitation at all regarding this. This was what Lhalu was unhesitatingly thinking about. Lhalu, it seems, had petitioned Lhasa many times, but the reply from Lhasa was, "If you think that you can manage the upcoming force with our existing strength, and if you can bear the responsibly, if you have to fight, then you decide. But at present, we are unconvinced to tell you to fight immediately. For the time being, we are not prepared to tell you to fight, and you should [just] to do things peacefully." It is said that that was the order from Lhasa. The reason for this was that, at that time, between Chamdo and Lhasa there was a wireless connection. To the US, England, and India, a representative was appointed [by the Kashag] to ask these countries to help with reinforcements. Someone was appointed to go to the States. Then via India, a representative was to go to China. These two representatives were sent. To India and England, representatives were left to be sent later on, but apparently telegrams were sent saying that the Chinese had invaded Tibetan territories and [for them] to assist us with arms and ammunition. The replies were all the same. They said, "You cannot manage the Chinese militarily and it is important to negotiate. We will assist from the point of negotiations. Even if we gave you arms, you don't have the personnel nor the training [to use them], and there is no way you can stop the Chinese. We cannot supply the arms as well as the soldiers and fight." The replies from the Americans, English and the Indians were pretty much the same. So that was it. In order for the country to in a big way, nobody from the outside was guaranteeing anything. Therefore, the Doji could not order going to fight them since there was nothing the government could send. If the small number of soldiers were sent and if they lost, then the Chinese could come straight up [to Lhasa]. So any hope of

winning a war was gone and all that was left was to wait for the beating. After Ngabö left an edict was sent saying that the situation on the border was urgent and both Kalöns should stay there and not slacken up as far as the border was concerned. However, since the two Kalön's ideas were at odds, there was nothing to discuss. So Lhalu said, "You Kungö have come. What do you think if I returned?" Ngabö said that that was alright. That he was appointed and Lhalu could leave if he wanted. So the two discussed and Lhalu came up. When it was heard that Lhalu was returning, an order was sent saying, "Whichever point you have reached, remain there and don't come up any further for the time being. If Ngabö is doing something at the border, then we need someone to back [him] up." When we were coming up, Lhalu was at Kongpo Giamda.

Q: After that what happened to Ngabö?

A: Soon after Lhalu left, circled via Khyungpo Tengchen and came from seven directions. One approach was via the north. All together they infiltrated from 8 directions. It was said that they circled from up there and behind Chamdo. [The area] behind Namtsola [Tib. gnam mtsho la] was full of the soldiers that came from up there [Qinghai]. Via the Gamtog Drukha [Tib. skam thog gru kha] ferry site and the main route they came to Chamdo. When Chamdo was notified about the loss of Gamtog Drukha, Ngabö and the other worker's discussed and immediately left. When they reached below Namtsola, which is one rest stop away [Tib. tsha phogs], a messenger came saying that the area behind Namtsola was full of Chinese and there was no way to go from Chamdo and Namtsola, and that was the reason Ngabö had to go to Drugugön. Since the route was blocked, he took a diversion. As soon as he arrived at Drugugön there was a discussion. At Chamdo, the Kalön was Ngabö. Below him there were the two Khenrim, that is the Khenjung and Rimshi. The Rimshi was Trogawa, maybe. The Khenjung was Kungö Simpön Khembo Möndrö Samka [Tib. smon grol bsam mkhar]. He came to India and later died. While they all discussed at Drugugön, Ngabö said, "Let us not do like that. About two officers should go to Namtsola and discuss with the Chinese, and another [two] to Chamdo. We should go and meet them face to face. Then tell them that I am at Drugugön and that I wish to discuss with them. So the soldiers should be ordered not to be trigger-happy. If we stayed at Chamdo, with the leaders staying behind and the soldiers going first, and if shooting started, then one could not risk that, so we retreated somewhat. But our main aim was to negotiate and we have not prepared for war." So Samkar Khenjung and Tshatrutsang Nyimala [Tib. tsha sprul tshang nyi ma lags] were sent to assist him. Nyimala volunteered to go and assist. There wasn't anyone who wanted to go, and so Khenjung said that he would go. When Ngabö asked if there were other volunteers, no one came forward. He said [Khenjung said] that Muja was there. Sawangchemmo told Muja to go. Muja said that he had come riding and his horse's leg was hurting and he asked Khenjung if this time he [Khenjung] could go alone. Khenjung said that this was what Muja said. Khenjung told him not to tell him this, but take leave from Sawangchemmo himself. "If Sawangchemmo tells me to go alone I will. I don't care if I have help or not. However, I can't give you leave. Sawangchemmo (Ngabö) is the appointed Kalön and there is no point in me giving you leave." This is what Khenjung said he said. Nyimala came towards the end of the meeting and they had already decided that the two would go. So Nyimala said, "If this is the situation then I will go. I will go". Khenjung said "That's good, but go and see Sawangchemmo and tell him. I'll start moving along and you come soon." Khenjung said that that was what he told him and he left. Nyimala immediately went to see Ngabö and soon came in time. So Khenjung and Nyimala went to the area where the day before they had diverted to Drugugön. When they got there, there was a number of households. When they got to the first household, they rested for a while and made some tea. They were thirsty since they had left early. In that household there was an old woman. She said, "Where are you people going around here? This morning, it seems it was a messenger, adrun, who went jingling with horse bell on the other shore of the river. Right there and then there were gun shots from a distance and both the rider and the horse were killed. If you go about this place you might get shot. Just now one or two soldiers came and they are just squatting around over on that side, you probably didn't see them. What are you doing and where do you think you are going?" They replied that they were going up to Chamdo or wherever they meet the Chinese, since they wished to meet them. The woman replied, "Well, wait here awhile. I'll just go look around. Anyway, what are you going to talk about?" They said, "Well, we are going down and if people use their guns then it would not be right. Sawang Ngabö sent us and told us to go and meet the Chinese leaders. That's what we want to say." "Is that all?" she asked. "That's it," they replied. "In that case, then come along, I'll interpret," she said. So she talked with them. They said that there were about 8 Chinese who dared not come into the house but were standing on the wall and smoking. Then they came to where she was and told them [Khenjung et cetera] that they were not allowed to go and had to wait there. That they had come from Namtsola and their leader was expected behind Namtsola this evening, and so they could talk with him. There was no need to go to Chamdo. Their leader at Chamdo and in this area were separate. So they were not permitted [to go] and they stayed that night. That night the leader came. Although there were only two people, the soldiers completely surrounded and guarded them. Then they were called in. There was a large house and the Tibetan mattresses were all folded and put in a circle and covered with carpets to be seated. There was a table in the middle. They served them black tea and questioned them. So they told them the situation. They asked if it was all true. They replied, "Yes." Then the Chinese told them that it was alright and [that they would] stay for the night and would leave the next day. Around dawn there was a whistle and the cavalry was saddled, and already in formation and ready to leave. Kungö Khenjung couldn't find his horse and took some time. Then the cavalry waited for him and helped him look for his horse. Then they went. Some soldiers went ahead. Others followed up the rear with the commander in the middle. The two of them were in front of the commander. As they went ahead, in the middle of the road the commander asked, "Are you sure the Kalön is there?" "Yes", they replied. "If I went up in this manner and if the Kalön has soldiers, then won't they start firing?" he enquired. "No, no way," they said. "Are you sure? You must take responsibility if they do," he said. "Of course," they replied. Then as they travelled further he asked, "Is the sawang definitely there?" "Yes," they replied. He once again asked if they would not shoot. They replied, never. When they got there, the Chamdo soldiers had already arrived and the sawang was about to leave. However, since Ngabö had already sent them to negotiate, Ngabö was not considered a prisoner of war since he had already started the negotiation process. He was to negotiate later for the treaty and be the main person. They say that that may have been the reason Ngabö stayed separately in a house which was also an office in Sithogthang [Tib. sri zlog thang]. It had been two days since Ngabö had arrived and the main leader Wang Siling was also staying at this place. When Ngabö came down, he came and here was a monastery on a high hill. Below that there was a road and across the river was Sithogthang. Ngabö and his group were brought down, the road was on this side. The main town of Chamdo was on this side. The monastery was on top of this. He did not have to go to the monastery nor the town. He was to go via the river and then here. Sawang was riding, but in the midst of soldiers in formation. So they circled the monastery and went through the market place of Chamdo. When they got to the three storied house, Wang Siling came down from the top floor to the doorway. They shook hands. He said, "I was busy looking at a letter and you had already arrived, otherwise I was going to come much further down to meet you." When they

got there, it was like earlier, with the mattresses arranged in a formation. Sawangchemmo said, "We have not prepared militarily and our intention was to negotiate. However, it was said that your soldiers had already arrived, and so in case they say that is where the Doji stays and firing commences in a helter skelter manner, then there will be a lot of commotion and it will be difficult to discuss. For this reason we diverted [you] [Tib. g.yol tsam] somewhat. I am mainly here to discuss peacefully between Tibet and China." Wang Siling said, "This is very good because even if you had 100,000 crack troops there is no way that you could have stopped us. Your idea is much more useful than 100,000 soldiers. This is very good." Ngabö said, "There are some troops around here and they have always been for the protection of the Doji and the eastern border guard. These are the permanent ones that have always been here. The government did not at all call on the militia nor did they send reinforcements and arms. We thought that if we stayed without guns then we would meet face to face and then we could discuss. First, since we have begun discussions, please inform your troops that until the discussions have begun, they should stay where they are and not proceed any further. Secondly, we are informing the government that we are starting discussing and in this regard we are sending two of our personnel [to Lhasa]. So please inform your troops of this and that they should not be stopped. , should the talks take place at Chamdo, Jarapemba, or at Lhasa?" Ngabö spoke of these three things. He replied, "We will inform our soldiers and it is also alright to send two of your personnel to report. Regarding the negotiation site, it cannot be decided right now." The main place where the Doji used to stay was occupied by the Chinese and so everyone was staying in the town. Ngabö was kept at the same place . The others were at Marthang, in the town itself.

Q: During this time, the Dalai Lama was already at Tromo, right?

A: Yes.

Q: So there must have been some talk of the 17-Point Agreement.

A: Regarding the 17-Point Agreement, it is said that the Chinese said that Ngabö and one or two others must participate in the negotiations. So the Chinese said that they wanted Ngabö because a connection was established. Regarding the others, Kheme Dzasa, Trunyichemmo Lhautara, and Sambo Depön, who were appointed from Tromo and sent via India. Nendrön Thubden Lengmönla was in Lhasa and he was sent to Chamdo. Kungö Taklha was good at Chinese and, as sort of an interpreter, he was sent. Kungö Thubden Lengmönla was the only one who went via land. For the discussions, the government had prepared some articles. Now I don't remember, though I have heard it all. Anyway, they were told that they should not fall below these requirements, and the various articles were written and sent with them. When they reached there, the Chinese had a 10 point article, saying that these were to be signed [Tib. ming rtags bzhang]. It was said that there was no way that we could sit down, gather around and discuss how to do things. There was no way at all to discuss according to the law. They just made a 10 point article and were showing that. In these articles there was nothing except what the Chinese wanted. Kungö Thubden Lengmön was very close to my uncle and our two shagtsang were very close. When he came to India, he stayed at Buxar. I too was there. Kungö Thubden Drothönla [Tib. thub bstan 'gro don lags], Champa Yöndenla, and we were all at Buxar. I was helping Thubden Lengmönla. So we just chatted and what I am telling you about the 17-Point Agreement is based on what Thubden Lengmönla said. This is regarding what happened at Beijing. Regarding the other aspects of it, it is based on the many government documents that I at one time worked on.

Q: You mean our government.

A: Yes.

Q: So there are documents on 17-Point Agreement.

A: No, it's not regarding the 17 Point Agreement, but I have worked on many important government documents. Thubden Lengmön said that they were handing down a 10 point document. He used to say that this Ngabö was so excellent. Ngabö however was in Chinese hands, and even after he came to India, he had full faith in Ngabö saying this man was really great. He said that they had many discussions among themselves and that it was even very difficult to do that once one came under force. Even where one needed to say something it was difficult to say or to consult. He said, "This Ngabö is just great and intelligent. He did not act as if there was something to talk about or something important. He smoked and was just relaxed. During the day he even went to town and looked around. Once everyone had gone to bed and it was around 12 at night, we would gradually meet in his room. The curtains were closed and the lights on. Then he made a draft based on the 10 point memorandum." He said that, "Among the 10 articles, it was very difficult to say that we would not accept this. However, we should see what we wanted and make additional points. So in the 17-Point Agreement, clauses like the Dalai Lama's power and status would not change, that monasteries and tratsang would be protected, that religious estates would remain. And whatever power the Dalai Lama was given in the Agreement, this was thought of by Ngabö." He said, "We among ourselves should be careful in what we say. They are the opponent and the enemy, there is nothing in that. Among us, regarding these things, you cannot say all sorts of things like sounds of goats and sounds of sheep [Tib. ra skad lug skad], and so whatever you have to say, let's hear it now. Once we have made the decision, then we are all together in unison [Tib. rgyag gcig mchong gcig]. Nothing else will be tolerated." He said that Ngabö was really making things sure among themselves. He said, "Is that it? Have we all agreed?" And they said "Yes." He said that once the draft was made, Ngabö did not even need to look at it. Whatever was written down he could speak about as if he was reading it. He would mention each article and say, "Now, isn't it like this?" So since they had already discussed it the previous night, they all said yes. "In this way that is how there came to be 7 extra articles," he said [Thubden Lengmön].

Q: Then later when consulting Tromo, wasn't there wireless communication?

A: Yes there was.

Q: There was some talk about not being allowed to consult Tromo.

A: What was written became a draft, right? So before the seal was to be put [on], he said that the government had to be consulted. They said, "There is no need to at all, because the one who has full authority of the local government, Ngabö Ngawang Jigme

[Tib. ngag dbang 'jigs med], and the one who has the full authority of the Zhongyang, named so and so, are already clearly named in the Agreement. So you both have the full authority and there is now no need to consult your government. If you want to put the seal on this agreement, then that's good. But you may also wish not to seal this document. Your life will not be harmed nor will any difficulties come upon you. We will escort you up to the Tibetan border. We have no difficulty at all. Our soldiers have been ordered to remain stationary wherever they are. We will have no difficulty in ordering them to advance and start pulling the trigger. So if you don't seal the document, this is the order we will give to the various regiments., to advance and pull the trigger." That was the reason they had no alternative but to sign the Agreement. If they did not sign, then we did not have any protection lined up one after another. It was just empty all the way to Ngari. So when they said that they would order the soldiers, there was no way that one could allow that, right? When the time came to seal and sign it, what we had to say was of no use, but what they said, the 10 points, in which they had already taken full control of Tibet, this was something that they couldn't bear the responsibility [for]. Anyway, it was so difficult that they had to seal it [sign it]. And it came to the occasion of manufacturing false seals.

Q: In the 17-Point Agreement, was it stated that Ngabö was the one with the full authority?

A: Yes, what I mentioned is all there. The words themselves.

Q: What I was thinking [was] that Ngabö thought that if he did consult Tromo, then they may not agree, and so he better take the opportunity now.

A: I don't think so. If one examines Ngabö's overall view, he felt from the beginning that the only option was to hold the talks. With this idea, it was possible that the country could make some changes in the wording. For example, the words local government of Tibet, something local is mentioned. So under the trigger they were saying to sign with the words local government of Tibet. Never until that time, nor in any document whatsoever, was there such a word (Local). It's like a new name given to a newly born person. There was never any local government of Tibet, only the Tibetan government [Tib. bod gzhung] or the Great Nation of Tibet [Tib. bod rgyal khab chen po]. Anyway, in order to put Tibet within China, that was the cardinal word. They did seal and sign it, however, under the gun they said, "Are you going to sign or not? If not, then we will order the soldiers to advance." Will this be sufficient? No matter what previous documents one looks at, it mentions the country of Tibet or the government of Tibet. Even if someone's name is there he is known as Tibet's Kudrak so and so. Never the phrase local overnment. That is for a region of a central government, like a state in India. This was one of the worst phrases in the 17-Point Agreement. This is why even today we say we do not agree. Something that was never so was made to be under the force of the gun.

Q: When the Dalai Lama was in Tromo, it is said that there were two factions, one saying the Dalai Lama should return to Tibet the other to India. What have you heard about that and who were the various people concerned in the opposing views? Did you have any discussions with Thubden Lengmönla?

A: No, I did not particularly. Beside the 17-Point Agreement, it is said that there were 5 or 6 side agreements. There is supposed to be one which states that the Dalai Lama can stay in India, in Tromo or return to Tibet. Earlier when Kungö Chemmo and all were asked in the Kashag's sitting room about this, they said that this was one. But they did not know all of it.

Q: Regarding this, you have not heard anything about the factions?

A: It seems that this did take place. I remember someone saying that one had to go back to one's own land. That if you just stay here then you would not be regarded even as a large business man. Was it Bumtang or somebody who said that? I have heard this but I don't know from where. That, "For the time being, one should go back to one's own land and that nothing will happen. If you just stay like that, then there will be nothing." "If the [snow] lion stays among the snows it's a lion. If the lion descends onto the plains, then there is nothing [Tib. seng ge gangs la bzugs na seng ge red/send ge thang la babs na gang yang yod ma red]."